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Abstract 
This article examines the relationship between reflecting and making in the context of the 
new institutional connection between research and art/design. The article argues that 
while this new dispensation offers exciting possibilities for fruitful cross- and 
interdisciplinary development, caution is necessary to ensure that the artistic domain 
retains a level of autonomy within the broader university. 
For elucidation, the article initially looks to the early history of education in our fields 
and to Pierre Bourdieu’s account of the “early moments of the autonomization of the 
artistic field,” in his critique of the “scholastic disposition.” Bourdieu recognises “a 
repression of the material determinations of symbolic practices” within those early 
developments: in effect, a repression of those embodied, situated, and practical aspects of 
art and design production. He regards such repression as a trait of the broader academy, 
both then and in subsequent and recent periods. The article argues that this attitude still 
provides the impetus for what James Elkins refers to as “the incommensurability of studio 
art production and university life.” 
The article further argues that a parity of esteem between reflecting and making is vital 
not only for the sake of the stability of the fields of art and design but for the ongoing 
development of the broader university. In this argument the article looks to the work of 
John Dewey, Martin Heidegger, and Hans-Georg Gadamer.  
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1. Introduction 
This article examines the relationship between reflecting and making in the context of 
what the call for contributions to this special issue refers to as “the new institutional 
connection between research and art/design.” This new dispensation may be seen as a 
positive development in terms of both the ongoing imbedding of the disciplines of art and 
design within the broader university and the consequent increased potential for 
interdisciplinary cross-fertilisation. It is also significant in realpolitik terms, that is, in 
terms of the positioning of our disciplines within the broader (hierarchal) field of the 
contemporary university. This article will argue that, to thrive, the disciplines of art and 
design must achieve a level of autonomy necessary for the stability of their position 
within that broader arena. It is therefore particularly apt that we address the question of 
“reflecting and making” now because of the potential this juncture provides for a 
redefining of the relationship between them, not only within these disciplines, but also 
with regard to that broader arena. Indeed as we shall later see, a number of commentators 
urge us to grasp this nettle.  
First a word of caution, in what follows reference is frequently made to the disciplines of 
art and design. However these disciplines are of course quite diverse so that such 
reference is problematic and therefore a proviso or qualification is necessary. Much of the 
field of design and design research might be characterised as being within the orbit of 
science or in Bourdieuian terms, as sharing common disciplinary territory with science; 
industrial design for example shares considerable territory with the disciplines of 
engineering. Reference in what follows, to the disciplines of art and design will preclude 
(if somewhat artificially) these territories. This is necessary because much of the 
argument outlined below holds only with respect to fine art and those aspects of design, 
understood in terms of Plato’s category described by Janaway as an “alognon pragma, a 
thing without account, a business without rational principle” (Janaway, 1995, p. 51). To 
clarify then, reference to the fields of “art and design” here will generally be confined to 
fine art and to that considerable territory of the field of design research, production, and 
practice, that shares with fine art this particular aspect, along with a historic indebtedness 
to practical, embodied, tacit, and experiential modes of knowing.  
While it is undeniable that the academic field of art and design has always encompassed 
both reflecting and making, theorising and practising, it is nevertheless important to 
acknowledge that perennial tensions attend what in some philosophical traditions are 
regarded as two fundamentally different existential stances. Moreover, these tensions are 
not only evident historically but also alive in contemporary experience within the 
disciplines. Therefore it is important that they are analysed, understood, and responded to 
appropriately in educational and research policy terms. The achievement of an 
equilibrium in terms of parity of esteem between reflecting and making is, it is argued 
below, essential not only for the stability of our disciplines internally, inevitably it also 
has implications for their status within the broader university. 
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While recognising that the new dispensation brings new challenges and opportunities, let 
us not imagine that this issue itself is new. In his critique of the “scholastic disposition” 
Pierre Bourdieu refers to the early modern period of art education as “early moments of 
the autonomization of the artistic field” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 25). This Renaissance period 
predates the distinction between fine art and design. It was a period of profound change 
that gave us, amongst many other things, perspective as well as the various theories of 
disegno. Its apex was arguably the founding of the Accademia del Disegno in Florence 
(1563). Bourdieu’s reference to “autonomization” pinpoints an important issue. As 
Goldstein explains, “that the academy viewed itself as an agent for professional 
advancement is made clear, then, by its name and deeds: the whole concept of an 
academy of disegno is inimical to a guild or workshop” (Goldstein, 1996, p. 19). As this 
account suggests, from the outset the academician’s desire for self-definition and self-
determination was bound up with another more negative impulse. If the prize of academic 
status provided the pull, the related desire to disassociate the fine arts from the socially 
stigmatised “menial” crafts provided the push. The new academicians wished, then, to 
associate themselves with reflection and to pointedly disassociate themselves from 
making.  
Bourdieu sees this tendency as not confined to the artistic field but symptomatic of a 
broader ingrained attitude that he diagnoses as a “repression of the material 
determinations of symbolic practices” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 20). This impulse is rooted in a 
deep-seated distrust of the messy business of making. Bourdieu puts it down to a species 
of “academic aristocratism” that demands an exclusion from “scholastic universes,” of 
the base means of production unless it be, as it were, by the tradesman’s entrance 
(Bourdieu, 2000, p. 25). 
Goldstein suggests that this perennial tension between theory and practice represents a 
persistent thread in the fabric of higher education in art and design from this period right 
through to the Bauhaus. He characterises it as a dualistic “problematising of the 
relationship between theory and practice” in terms of a “resolutely dialectical engagement 
with [theory] as something demonstrably different from practice” (Goldstein, 1996, p. 
24).  However the origins of this tension are in both philosophical and historical terms 
more deeply rooted and more persistent.  
2. The Problem With Production 
The “problematising” dialectic that Goldstein acknowledges resurfaces in current debates 
regarding the validity and status of practice-based research. This is particularly evident in 
the animated discourse that has attended the emergence of the PhD degree in the field of 
fine art (Elkins, 2009). It exposes deep anxieties about what “research” might mean in 
these contexts, as well as questions concerning the normative requirement that a PhD 
thesis contribute “new knowledge” to the field. These anxieties inevitably raise questions 
about the epistemological standing of practice in the sense of production, in other words, 
questions regarding the truth-claims of art practice as praxis. At the heart of this debate is 
the issue of whether certain acts of making in themselves function as an uncovering of 
truth and thereby produce knowledge. Or alternatively whether the epistemological 
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paradigm represented by the “scholastic disposition” ought to hold sway--a paradigm that 
regards the production of knowledge as inextricable from textual expression. This issue is 
addressed below and also elsewhere (McGuirk, in press). 
Fiona Candlin’s critique of a report of the UK Council for Graduate Education (Frayling 
et al., 1997) is instructive in this regard. Candlin notes the report’s assertion that 
“doctoral characteristics of originality, mastery and contribution to the field are held to be 
demonstrated through the original creative work” (Candlin, 2000, p. 5, my emphasis). 
However she is critical of the authors’ insistence on an extensive accompanying text to 
render the work “precise, clear and accessible” and to demonstrate “doctoral powers of 
analysis and mastery of contextual knowledge . . . auditable by knowledgeable peers” 
(emphasis in the original). This, she suggests, effectively privileges theory over the 
production of art, “since it is the theoretical component of the doctorate that [ultimately] 
gives the work PhD standing” (Candlin, 2000, pp. 5-6). She interprets moreover the 
report as presuming that: “art practice, no matter how cognitively sophisticated and 
theoretically rich . . . cannot be deemed research without the supporting apparatus of 
conventionally presented academic study” (Candlin, 2000, p. 6).  
Candlin argues that, rather than “open[ing] out the boundaries of academia to 
acknowledge different ways of thinking and working,” the report unfortunately actually 
“reduces art practice to the conventions of academia” (Candlin, 2000, p. 12). 
Commenting on the emergence of the PhDs in fine art, Woodfield suggests that the 
phenomenon was in no small measure a response to “changes brought about by . . . the 
current [dominant] role of ‘theory’ in fine art practices.” In identifying factors that led to 
the hegemony of theory and conceptual models of knowledge, which contribute to a 
disparagement of practice, he notes that from the late 1960s onwards, “Radicalism 
emerged as a deep requirement of interesting artistic practice and as ideology has to be 
articulated verbally to become recognised. Grunt practice garnered no respect” 
(Woodfield, 2004, p. 105, my emphasis). 
As our disciplines become further embedded within higher education, it appears that this 
historic disparagement of practice as production, rather than being diminished, is often 
reinforced. Elkins (2009) recognises that the problem of securing the place of “studio-art 
production” within the university is still an “immensely difficult” one. He refers 
specifically to the problematic status of “the experience of making--its exact pedagogy, 
its methods, knacks, and skills, its feel”; he sees this as the reason for what he starkly 
terms “the incommensurability of studio art production and university life” and he 
contrasts this with the far greater acceptance that the theory-based business of 
“conceptualising” finished artworks finds within the contemporary field of fine art itself 
and within the broader university (Elkins, 2009, p. 128). 
3. Nomenclature 
With regard to the relatively new practice-based and practice-led PhD in fine art, Elkins 
has noted that it has become commonplace for the term research and attendant concepts 
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such as new knowledge to be considered native to the discipline rather than what he 
describes as “artificial imports from UK administrative terminology” (Elkins, 2009, p. 
111). Elkins recognises such enforcement of policy-driven nomenclature to be an 
obstacle to the progress of research in art and design. It amounts to taking concepts and 
epistemological paradigms from the hard sciences and superimposing them on these 
emerging fields. Moreover Elkins views this process as being animated by a purely 
administrative logos. In this specific context, Nevanlinna warns us that “transplanting the 
terminology of a science policy” such as “research . . . into another context is not and 
cannot be an innocent, value-free process” (Finnish writer Tuomas Nevanlinna, cited in 
Wilson, 2009, p. 63). 
Bourdieu’s work on the interrelationship of disciplinary fields proves an invaluable 
reference in this matter. He portrays the dynamics of “disciplinary struggles” in territorial 
terms, where the spoils of “cultural” and “scientific capital” are contested by weaker and 
stronger, “dominated” and “dominating” disciplines (Bourdieu, 2004 p. 67). Such 
dynamics are doubtless at play in the context of the new dispensation referred to earlier, 
as the neophyte disciplines of art and design and their nascent research cultures jostle to 
gain a foothold and to position themselves in the broader field.  
Ever alert to the territoriality of disciplines and the power struggles between them, 
Bourdieu recognises the relative dominance of science, particularly the physical sciences, 
in this hierarchy. He suggests, for example, that physics and especially quantum physics 
is “set up as the sole model of scientificity, in the name of a social privilege converted 
into an epistemological privilege by epistemologists and philosophers” (Bourdieu, 2004, 
p. 65).  
Given the historical and philosophical biases outlined above, disciplines of practice as 
well as practice-based and practice-led research-cultures find themselves disadvantaged 
in terms of Bourdieuian “scientific” and indeed “cultural capital” relative to more 
established scientific and theoretical disciplines. There is little doubt that this provides 
much of the impetus for the marginalisation of practice, highlighted by Elkins, in terms of 
studio-art production within the university. Bourdieu highlights the socio-political 
dimension to this phenomenon in his remark that  “through oppositions like that between 
theory and practice, the whole social order is present in the very way that we think about 
that order” is pertinent (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 83).  
4. Knowledge as Domination 
Three major philosophers of the twentieth century--John Dewey, Martin Heidegger, and 
Hans-Georg Gadamer--share an unease regarding the disparagement in Western 
epistemology of the kind of knowledge which is practical and embodied, and the action, 
application, and production associated with such knowledge. Gadamer identifies this 
disparagement with the “knowledge as dominion” epistemological stance (Gadamer, 
2004, p. 310).  
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Dewey objects to a related view of knowledge that frames it as something static or fixed, 
capable of being objectified and stored like a commodity on library shelves. Knowledge, 
or “learning” is conceived of in terms of stasis and viewed as “an accumulation of 
cognitions as one might store material commodities in a warehouse.” This is the idea that 
truth is passive and simply there for the taking, as Dewey phrases it: “truth exists ready-
made somewhere” (Dewey, 1930, p. 390). As we shall later see, this insight relates to 
Heidegger’s framing of his concept of the “present-at-hand.” 
Dewey regards the contemplative attitude as essentially aesthetic rather than truly 
intellectual. He is more favourably disposed to the epistemic significance of making, 
something he shares with his contemporary in another, very different philosophical 
tradition, Heidegger. While there are, of course, major differences in their accounts, both 
Dewey and Heidegger champion in varied ways the epistemological status of production 
and in particular the production of art. For Dewey the true meaning of knowledge lies in 
use--what we do with it. He reminds us that in common parlance learning is often 
tellingly used with reference to an accomplishment, something merely decorous, a 
testament to leisured existence (something analysed by Bourdieu in terms of his theories 
of cultural capital). This view is definitely not Dewey’s epistemological vision, as he 
forthrightly explains: “Only that which has been organized into our disposition so as to 
enable us to adapt the environment to our needs and to adapt our aims and desires to the 
situation in which we live is really knowledge” (Dewey, 1930, p. 400). 
Similarly Heidegger regards the dominance of Cartesian objectivism in Western thought 
as limiting, in that, as he puts it, there is, in epistemological terms, a “deficiency in our 
having to do with-the-world concernfully,” that is in our knowing, when it is at a remove 
from the world, when it is divorced from, or “holds back” from “producing and 
manipulating and the like” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 88). If we look at “the Things” merely 
theoretically, he asserts, we adopt an impoverished way of being in the world--we are 
“tarrying alongside” concerned merely with representation: how things look (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 88). He contrasts this with the kind of knowing that truly belongs to Dasein or 
“being-in-the-world” which is a situated, engaged, concerned, and thereby more 
authentic, mode of knowing (Heidegger, 1962, p. 88-89). Indeed Heidegger’s core 
concept, Dasein implies just such a stance. As Feenberg explains, “human beings, called 
‘Dasein’ by Heidegger can only be understood as always already involved in a world . . . 
The things of the world are revealed to Dasein as they are encountered in use …” 
(Feenberg 2005, p. 2).  
Heidegger, like Dewey (1930, pp. 306-307), points to the Greek bias whereby the 
contemplative life “bios theoretikos,” so redolent of academic life, is contrasted 
negatively with “bios praktikos,” “the way of life dedicated to action and productivity” 
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 164). He suggests that the hegemony of this stance in Western 
culture was reinforced in the Roman period through the translation of the Greek concept 
theoria as the Latin contemplato. From this comes the English verb to contemplate with 
all its connotations of withdrawal and detachment. Contemplato, he reminds us stems 
from the Latin templum, a translation ofthe Greek word temnein meaning to cut or divide 
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 164). In existential terms, then, Heidegger negatively associates the 
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categorising and enframing impulse with the “theoretical attitude” and posits it as a 
source of a dominant alienating objectivist metaphysics of representation: 
In theoria transformed into contemplato there comes to the fore the impulse, already 
present in Greek thinking, of a looking at that sunders and compartmentalizes. A type of 
encroaching advance by successive interrelated steps, towards that which is to be grasped 
by the eye makes itself normative in knowing. (Heidegger, 1977, p. 166, my emphasis) 
He uses an illuminating metaphor to caution against the inherent acquisitive, 
grasping nature that epitomises the “knowledge as dominion” 
epistemological paradigm, with all the attendant power relations. When it 
comes to knowledge he warns: “the perceiving of what is known is not a 
process of returning with one's booty to the ‘cabinet’ of consciousness after 
one has gone out and grasped it” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 89, my emphasis). 
As antidote to this stance Heidegger posits a more circumspective approach to knowing--
an attitude of care--and he associates this with the Greek concept of techne, the kind of 
engaged careful knowing we find in artistic making (Heidegger, 1962, p. 88). As he 
explains:  
What we usually call “knowing” is being acquainted with something and its 
qualities. In virtue of these cognitions we “master” things. This mastering 
“knowledge” is given over to a being at hand, to its structure and its 
usefulness. Such “knowledge” seizes the being, “dominates” it, and thereby 
goes beyond it and constantly surpasses it. The character of essential 
knowing is entirely different. It concerns the being in its ground--it intends 
Being. Essential “knowing” does not lord it over what it knows but is 
solicitous towards it (Heidegger, 1992, p. 3). 
Heidegger suggests that the contemplative stance has in fact become synonymous with 
both the “scientific” and “theoretical attitude.” He analyses this in terms of his concept of 
“presence-at-hand” (Vorhandenheit), which he presents as an attitude to “Things” that 
encounters them exclusively in analytical mode, and regards them as both perpetually 
available and precisely quantifiable. Presence-at-hand is the stance of the objective 
Cartesian observer concerned solely with the facts of the thing or concept, rather than 
being engaged with them in use. He contrasts this stance with “readiness-to-hand” 
(Zuhandenheit). This he identifies with the situated, engaged, indeed transparent way we 
encounter things in and through use. His famous example is the hammer (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 98). We can never know what is essential about a hammer through objective 
analysis. As Heidegger sees it, “the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more 
we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become” 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 98). 
And Heidegger constantly emphasises the kind of engagement represented by readiness-
to-hand in his analysis of the making of art. He wants to say that we may come to 
knowledge through such work, the kind of engagement we find in application 
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(Heidegger, 1993a). He associates this knowledge with care and circumspection, which 
he “distinguishes from theoretical knowledge” (Gallagher, 2009, p. 7).  
George Steiner provides a useful interpretation that gives us an insight into what 
Heidegger sees as the hostility of the theoretical attitude towards experiential knowledge:  
Platonic-Cartesian cogitation and the Cartesian foundation of the world’s 
reality in human reflection are attempts to “leap through or across the 
world” . . . in order to arrive at the noncontingent purity of eternal Ideas or 
of mathematical functions and certitudes. But this attempted leap from and 
to abstraction is radically false to the facticity of the world as we encounter 
it, as we live it. (Steiner, 1987, p. 88) 
In questioning this stance, Heidegger asserts the legitimacy of practical and experiential 
knowledge, insisting that, “the kind of care that manipulates things and puts them to use . 
. . has its own kind of knowledge” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 95). Here he is pointing to the 
significance of the kind of tacit knowledge of the maker whose knowledge, in contrast to 
the theoretician, is situated, embodied and thereby integrated within her environment. 
Steiner’s interpretation of this is also illuminating:  
Appropriate use, performance, manual action, possess their own kind of 
sight. Heidegger names it “circumspection.” Any artist, any craftsman, any 
sportsman . . . will know exactly what Heidegger means and will know how 
often the trained hand “sees” quicker and more delicately than eye and 
brain. Theoretical vision [Heidegger says] “. . . constructs a canon for itself 
in the form of method.”[. . .] Here methodological abstraction replaces the 
immediate authority of “readiness-to-hand.” Heidegger’s differentiation is 
not only eloquent in itself; it brilliantly inverts the Platonic order of values 
which sets the theoretical contemplator high above the artist, the craftsman, 
the manual worker. (Steiner, 1987, p. 90, emphasis in the original) 
This description cuts to the heart of the tension between the theoretical, objectivist 
approach to knowing represented by method and the kind of knowing native to practice in 
terms of production, and to making. The “incommensurability” of art making with 
“university life” that Elkins identifies is therefore founded, not in any mere institutional 
qualm or orthodoxy but in what Heidegger characterises as the “unjustified absolutization 
of the theoretical” (Heidegger cited in Safranski, 1997, p. 97). The “de-experiencing” of 
the world that Heidegger suggests is the “theoretical attitude” leads also to a denial of the 
lived reality of making, as a dealing with the “Things” in all their concrete richness 
(Safranski, 1998 p. 97). 
5. Method Rampant 
It is a familiar truism that all research must have its method. Indeed method has become a 
key term within the nomenclature to which Elkins alludes. However as we have seen for 
Heidegger, as Steiner so eloquently explains, method is not a simple innocuous term, on 
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the contrary, it bears the authority of both theory and science’s privileged epistemological 
status, evinced by its claim of a monopoly in terms of the revelation of the “real,” 
whereby it effectively eclipses other non-systematic ways of knowing. While Heidegger 
wishes to give method its due, he questions this epistemic valorisation which he sees as 
rampant within western epistemology.  
In his essay “Modern Science, Metaphysics and Mathematics,” Heidegger (1993b) is at 
pains to explain this and the significance of the term method. To do so, he focuses on an 
early work by Descartes: Reguale ad directionem ingenii [Rules for the Direction of the 
Mind]. From its list of rules or propositions, Heidegger singles out a number for analysis, 
including Regula IV, in which Descartes simply states that “method is necessary for 
discovering the truth of nature” (Heidegger, 1993b, p. 300). Heidegger’s interpretation of 
this is significant in that he highlights what he regards as the true significance of method 
and also its ramifications: 
This rule does not intend the platitude that a science must have its method, 
but it wants to say that the procedure, i.e., how in general we are to pursue 
things (methodos), decides in advance what truth we shall seek out in the 
things. [. . .] Method is not one piece of equipment of science among others 
but the primary component out of which is first determined what can 
become object and how it becomes object (Heidegger, 1993b, p. 300, my 
emphasis).  
What Heidegger asserts here is that reality--the “real”--responds and reveals according to 
how we question it. If we question it methodically it reveals itself in very particular ways. 
Heidegger’s fundamental objection is to the “absolutization” of any single particular 
mode or procedure of revealing. In his view, Cartesian method effectively eclipses 
alternative valid forms of knowing because it precludes modes of questioning that are not 
part of its repertoire. Method is oblivious of certain ways of knowing particularly the 
kinds of knowing arrived at through techne as art. Moreover, despite appearances to the 
contrary, this outwardly detached-seeming attitude to things is in reality fundamentally 
rapacious in its systematic domination of “Things” and entities:  
modern science as theory in the sense of an observing that strives after, is a 
refining of the real that does encroach uncannily upon it. . . . Science sets 
upon the real. It orders it into place to the end that at any given time the real 
will exhibit itself as an interacting network . . . The real becomes secured in 
its objectness. (Heidegger, 1977, pp. 167-168) 
Heidegger recognises that Cartesian method constitutes a world-picture in the form of a 
systematised mathematical conception of the world. Through method, as he puts it, “the 
mathematical now sets itself up as the principle of all knowledge” and thereby all other 
forms of knowledge “whether tenable or not” are brought into question (Heidegger, 
1993b, p. 301). In Steiner’s terms, encountered earlier, theoretical vision “constructs a 
canon for itself” as “method” (Steiner, 1987, p. 90). Method therefore cannot be regarded 
merely as some neutral set of practices or procedures. On the contrary, for Heidegger 
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method is wedded to the short-sightedness inherent in the dominant technological 
worldview of our era. It is from that authority, in fact, that methodological sciences 
ultimately acquire their “epistemological privilege.” 
It is precisely because certain kinds of knowledge readily associated with making, like 
tacit, experiential and practical knowledge, are of their nature inaccessible to calculation 
that they are not amenable to the application of method. Cartesian method, as Adorno and 
Horkheimer also suggest, is founded on a unitary and exclusive model of knowledge 
whose paragon is “formal logic,” which they describe as providing a “schema of the 
calculability of the world” (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1997, p. 7). 
Art, they suggest, encompasses forms of knowledge extraneous to the Enlightenment’s 
“universal” system, knowledge that can accommodate the particular, the contingent and 
the irrational aspects of the “real,” those precise aspects overlooked by method. The arts 
do not fit the Enlightenment schema, “to the Enlightenment, that which does not reduce 
to numbers, and ultimately to the one, becomes illusion; modern positivism writes it off 
as literature” (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1997, p. 7). Safranski succinctly formulates 
Heidegger’s almost identical stance: “[what] the sciences call the ‘irrational’,” he tells us 
in a memorable phrase, is for Heidegger nothing less than “the experience-remainder in 
the blind spot of the theoretical attitude” (in Safranski, 1998, p. 98).  
The difficulty of accommodating practice in terms of art production under the aegis of 
method is therefore due to what is essentially a category error.  It is a mistake then to 
apply methodological procedures where process-based approaches of engagement and 
participation, more accommodating of the kind of tacit, experiential, and practical 
knowledge are required.  It follows therefore that the problems that ensue are ultimately 
structural in nature and are therefore not amenable to being overcome by any mere 
cultural adjustment, nor can they be negated merely for the sake of administrative 
contingency. 
6. Method Without Art 
To understand the extent to which artistic means and processes of production are low 
ranking in “cultural” and “scientific capital” terms within the arena of the university, we 
need look no further than the culture of scientific practice with its fascinating, entrenched 
taboos. Bourdieu reminds us that science has always employed tacit and experiential 
knowledge in terms of practical skills and knacks, however scientists go to great lengths 
to cover their tracks in this regard (Bourdieu, 2004). Bourdieu cites an illuminating 
passage regarding scientific texts from Peter Medawar: 
findings appear more decisive and more honest [when] the most creative 
aspects of the research disappear, giving the impression that imagination, 
passion, art have played no part in them and that the innovation results not 
from the passionate activity of deeply committed hands and brains but from 
passive submission to the sterile precepts of the so-called “Scientific 
Method.” (Medawar cited in Bourdieu, 2004, p. 21) 
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Hans-Georg Gadamer in his defence of hermeneutics also analyses this impetus in terms 
of the Enlightenment’s assault on all prejudice, which necessitated a denial of its own 
historical roots in traditions other than the rational, as he explains “the fundamental 
prejudice of the Enlightenment is the prejudice against prejudice itself . . .” (Gadamer, 
2004, p. 273). The Enlightenment assault on prejudice obscures its own foundational 
prejudices towards older traditions that encompass forms of practical knowledge founded 
in rhetoric and judgement. This represents a refusal to extend epistemic credit to all 
knowledge that cannot easily be made explicit, knowledge like experiential, tacit, and 
practical knowledge, forms of knowledge more native to both art and design. 
Gadamer critiques what he sees as the inappropriate imposition of methods derived from 
the natural sciences onto research practices within the humanities generally, whereby 
from the nineteenth century onward “the human sciences’ claim to know something true 
came to be measured by a standard foreign to it--namely the methodical thinking of 
modern science” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 21). Jean Grondin, Gadamer’s biographer, explains 
his motivation: 
when it came to the Geisteswissenschaften [human sciences], people go 
wrong when they try to force them to conform to the systematic ideal of 
methodically constructed knowledge, a model that neither can nor should 
suffice for them. What was involved in the Geisteswissenschaften was a 
completely different kind of knowledge, namely, participation in, not 
dominion over, the experience of meaning. (Grondin, 2003, p. 268) 
The difficulties diagnosed by Gadamer with regard to the humanities parallel many of the 
current dilemmas within the specific disciplines of art and design and, as we shall see, 
point to remedies. 
7. Knowledge, Service, and Application 
In crafting his hermeneutics, Gadamer specifically rejects the model of “knowledge as 
domination . . . appropriation . . . possession” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 310). He suggests that 
an appropriate model for the kind of knowledge we need in the humanities and the arts is 
found in “legal and theological hermeneutics” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 310). As he explains, 
in these fields rather that the “knowledge as dominion” epistemological paradigm there 
prevails a conception of knowledge founded in service and application whether it be in 
the service of God or of the community: “To interpret the law’s will or the promises of 
God is clearly not a form of domination but of service. They are interpretations--which 
include application--in the service of what is considered valid” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 310). 
Gadamer here points to a knowledge that is useful, or in Dewey’s term, “of avail” 
(Dewey, 1930, p. 395). This represents a knowledge that is “in the service” of human 
beings, their traditions, their institutions and generally of that which they value 
(Gadamer, 2004, p. 310).  In the case of jurisprudence and theology, validity is ultimately 
founded on the assent of a community. The meaning, validity, and epistemological value 
of fine art and design are surely also bound up with, indeed founded on, this service to 
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that which is “considered valid.” It might be argued that the validity of the truth or the 
knowledge uncovered by art, and more particularly design, ultimately rests upon 
judgement. The validation accorded by a community to the truth revealed by works of art 
and design and the knowledge inherent to them is based on taste and discernment rather 
than on conformation to an absolutist abstract conception of truth--the kind of truth 
characterised by Heidegger as mere truth as correspondence, the “truth as correctness” of 
conventional metaphysics (Heidegger, 1993a, pp. 176-177). Scientific truth, Gadamer 
suggests, must in any event not be allowed to eclipse the kind of truth described by Vico 
(1668-1744) in his observation: “the true and the made are convertible (verum et factum 
convertuntur)” (Miner, 1998, p. 53). Vico, an early critic of the imposition of Cartesian 
method onto the humanities, understood that in these human realms of art, jurisprudence, 
and theology, truth ought to be regarded as a human--indeed a communal--construct. 
8. The Scholastic Disposition 
Martin Jay describes Cartesian perspectivism, as the “dominant scopic regime of the 
modern era” (Jay, 1994, pp. 69-70). For Bourdieu, Cartesian perspectivism ushered in the 
“scholastic disposition.” Ironically the picture of the world it presents is indebted to early 
developments within the fields of art and design, like pictorial perspective, the camera 
obscura and scientific cartography. Like Heidegger, Bourdieu sees the scholastic 
disposition as founded on an objectivist worldview. It is a disposition characterised by 
detachment from the world of things, he characterises it as a “distant lofty gaze” 
(Bourdieu, 2000, p. 22). This fixed ocularcentric detachment, explains the incapacity of 
the scholastic disposition for any real self-reflection or self-critique. The hermetically 
sealed camera obscura represents a “point of view on which no point of view can be 
taken” (Bourdieu, 2003, p. 22). This is a significant point because it explains the 
blindness, as outlined earlier, of the scholastic disposition in terms of its failure to esteem 
the epistemic worth of other ways of knowing. The “scholastic view” is, as Bourdieu 
recognises, particularly blind to the epistemic worth and value of making, that is of 
practice as production, these ways of knowing rest as it were along with Heidegger’s 
“irrational,” within its blind spot. 
Bourdieu also calls the scholastic disposition by the name “skholè,” a state that 
represents, as he explains, “the scholastic situation (of which the academic world 
represents the institutionalized form)” (Bourdieu, 2000, p 13). Skholè is posited as a 
quintessentially bracketed state, “liberated” by definition “from practical occupations and 
preoccupations” but by the same token isolated and unable to fully recognise itself or its 
internal logic. As Bourdieu explains: 
There is nothing that “pure” thought finds it harder to think than skholè, the 
first and most determinant of all the social conditions of possibility of 
“pure” thought, and also the scholastic disposition which inclines its 
possessors to suspend the demands of the situation, the constraints of 
economic and social necessity, and the urgencies it imposes or the ends it 
proposes. (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 12) 
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9. Conclusion 
There is little doubt that the “scholastic disposition” still permeates the academic milieu 
and this cannot fail to have a bearing on the development of the disciplines of fine art and 
design as they become more integrated within the university. In this context Bourdieu 
reminds us of Oakeshott’s criticism of “the rationalist tendency to devalue practical 
traditions in favour of explicit theories” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 82). This article has 
highlighted a number of issues regarding the existential stance represented by concepts 
like contemplation, theory, and method. This short list is indeed an honoured one in our 
academic cultures and justifiably so, and certainly in terms of academic villainy these are 
most definitely not the usual suspects. All the more reason to heed the concerns of 
Dewey, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Bourdieu: their thought in this regard urges us to 
question the valorisation of the kind of knowing represented by these pillars of academic 
life in order to seek a parity of esteem between reflecting and making that would grant 
epistemic value to both of these fundamentally different ways of knowing. 
It has been suggested that the disciplines of art and design are somehow in an adolescent 
phase of development (Mottram, 2009, p. 24), and that we cannot afford to ignore the 
collegiate anxieties, concerns, requirements, and interests of older more established 
fields. This is no doubt the case, however neither must we ignore the reality that the 
university is, as are all human institutions, a site of power-play where each discipline or 
field, in a Bourdieuian sense, is subject to both external pressures and internal forces both 
positive and negative. As Bourdieu explains, every academic field has, and essentially 
must have, a “degree of autonomy” if it is to thrive or even survive. However as he 
explains this autonomy is “not a given but a historical conquest endlessly having to be 
undertaken anew” (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 47). 
And so we come full circle to the issue of a renewed autonomisation of the disciplines of 
art and design under a new disciplinary dispensation. As that process continues to unfold 
we would do well to recognise that a mature discipline, just like a mature person, body, or 
institution, must hold fast to central aspects of its knowledge and traditions, while 
embracing such change as serves its purposes and maintains its autonomy. A healthy 
autonomous field according to Bourdieu is one in which:  
the system of forces that are constitutive of the structure of the field 
(tension) is relatively independent of the forces exerted on the field 
(pressure). It has, as it were, the “freedom” it needs to develop its own 
necessity, its own logic, its own nomos. (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 47) 
It is this equilibrium that is at stake at this moment with regard to, for example, our 
framing of the PhD in the fields of art and design, whereby the need for the equilibrium 
referred to by Bourdieu becomes paramount. It must moreover be the kind of equilibrium 
that encompasses both reflecting and making in terms of a parity of esteem. If we lose 
this equilibrium, that loss will alter our disciplines at all levels--and not only at PhD 
level--so the stakes are indeed high.  
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Gadamer lamented that in the case of the humanities in general, in the late nineteenth 
century, they had effectively lost the freedom to decide their nomos: that is their 
principles and practices, and in this way their “claim to know something true came to be 
measured by a standard foreign to [them] . . . the methodical thinking of modern science” 
(Gadamer, 2004, p. 21). Gadamer here presents a cautionary tale. We do well to 
remember that making is an integral and essential part of the logic, necessity, and nomos 
of art and design.  
Such a rallying call may appear defensive, however it is important to remember 
Bourdieu’s analysis to the dynamics of disciplinary fields, specifically his suggestion that 
in order to be a full and effective participant in the broader arena of the university each 
field must attain and hold a structural position of strength. From such a secure position, 
which can only be achieved through the autonomy that Bourdieu advocates, the 
disciplines of art and design can play a more significant part in the development of the 
kind of university that accommodates making as well as reflecting. This represents an 
enormous opportunity for the university.  
With regard to the evolution of “the practice-based PhD,” Candlin points out that 
“whether or not it includes theoretical elements” it is bound to differ greatly from 
equivalent “conventional” terminal degrees in more established fields (Candlin, 2000, p. 
11). She suggests, moreover, that rather than problematising this situation and responding 
to it by “making art practice as scholarly as possible” we might see it in more positive 
terms as “an opportunity to re-think academic norms” (Candlin, 2000, p. 11). And this 
view is echoed by Elkins who suggests that the PhD degrees in art and design present a 
real opportunity for a “university-wide debate about the unity or fragmentation of the 
contemporary university,” because, as he explains:  
Universities have not been set up to think about the confluence of making 
and studying, understanding and knowledge, practice-led research and 
research-led practice, writing and seeing. Studio art practice could be the 
place to carry those discussions forward. (Elkins. 2009, pp 121-122) 
In light of this, the lesson Bourdieu dispenses is crucial: structurally sound, autonomous 
fields have more to offer the university as a whole than fields or disciplines that are 
limited in their freedom to develop their particular nomos.  
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